“1.8 This code has been developed to address concerns over the potential for abuse or misuse of surveillance by the state in public places. ” “2.1 Modern and forever advancing surveillance camera technology provides increasing potential for the gathering and use of images and associated information. These advances vastly increase the ability and capacity to capture, store, share and analyse images and information. This technology can be a valuable tool in the management of public safety and security, in the protection of people and property, in the prevention and investigation of crime, and in bringing crimes to justice. Technological advances can also provide greater opportunity to safeguard privacy. Used appropriately, current and future technology can and will provide a proportionate and effective solution where surveillance is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and meets a pressing need.” “2.2 In general, any increase in the capability of surveillance camera system technology also has the potential to increase the likelihood of intrusion into an individual's privacy. The Human Rights Act 1998 gives effect in UK law to the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Some of these rights are absolute, whilst others are qualified, meaning that it is permissible for the state to interfere with the right provided that the interference is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and the interference is proportionate. Amongst the qualified rights is a person's right to respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence, as provided for by Article 8 of the ECHR.” “2.3 That is not to say that all surveillance camera systems use technology which has a high potential to intrude on the right to respect for private and family life. Yet this code must regulate that potential, now and in the future. In considering the potential to interfere with the right to privacy, it is important to take account of the fact that expectations of privacy are both varying and subjective. In general terms, one of the variables is situational, and in a public place there is a zone of interaction with others which may fall within the scope of private life. An individual can expect to be the subject of surveillance in a public place as CCTV, for example, is a familiar feature in places that the public frequent. An individual can, however, rightly expect surveillance in public places to be both necessary and proportionate, with appropriate safeguards in place.” “2.4 The decision to use any surveillance camera technology must, therefore, be consistent with a legitimate aim and a pressing need. Such a legitimate aim and pressing need must be articulated clearly and documented as the stated purpose for any deployment. The technical design solution for such a deployment should be proportionate to the stated purpose rather than driven by the availability of funding or technological innovation. Decisions over the most appropriate technology should always take into account its potential to meet the stated purpose without unnecessary interference with the right to privacy and family life. Furthermore, any deployment should not continue for longer than necessary.” “3.2.3 Any use of facial recognition or other biometric characteristic recognition systems needs to be clearly justified and proportionate in meeting the stated purpose, and be suitably validated 4 . It should always involve human intervention before decisions are taken that affect an individual adversely.” (Footnote 4: “The Surveillance Camera Commissioner will be a source of advice on validation of such systems.”) “4.8.1 Approved standards may apply to the system functionality, the installation and the operation and maintenance of a surveillance camera system. These are usually focused on typical CCTV installations, however there may be additional standards applicable where the system has specific advanced capability such as ANPR, video analytics or facial recognition systems , or where there is a specific deployment scenario, for example the use of body-worn video recorders.” “4.12.1 Any use of technologies such as ANPR or facial recognition systems which may rely on the accuracy of information generated elsewhere such as databases provided by others should not be introduced without regular assessment to ensure the underlying data is fit for purpose.” “4.12.2 A system operator should have a clear policy to determine the inclusion of a vehicle registration number or a known individual's details on a reference database associated with such technology. A system operator should ensure that reference data is not retained for longer than necessary to fulfil the purpose for which it was originally added to a database.”
Surveillance Camera Commissioner's AFR Guidance
The Surveillance Camera Commissioner has published “guidance” or “advice” on the use of AFR by the police in conjunction with CCTV entitled “The Police Use of
Automated Facial Recognition Technology with Surveillance Camera Systems” (“the AFR Guidance”). The guidance explains the roles of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and Information Commissioner in relation to the regulation of the police use of AFR. The Surveillance Camera Commissioner AFR Guidance is designed to assist relevant authorities in complying with their statutory obligations “arising under section 31(1) ” of the PFA 2012 and the SC Code (paragraph 1.3).
The AFR Guidance was promulgated on the basis that the Surveillance Camera Commissioner “should provide advice and information to the public and system operators about the effective, appropriate, proportionate and transparent use of surveillance camera systems” (SC Code, paragraph 5.6). It is said that the AFR Guidance indicates “the way in which the Commissioner is minded to construe the particular statutory provisions arising from PFA 2012 and those provisions within the Code of Practice in the absence of case law” (paragraph 1.8).
The AFR Guidance focuses on the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of deployments of AFR. It also provides advice on conducting risk assessments and making use of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner's ‘Self-Assessment Tool’. In respect of watchlists there are suggestions concerning the nature of images used to produce watchlists.
Unlike the SC Code, there is no requirement for SWP to have regard to the AFR Guidance. This guidance was first published in October 2018 and re-published without changes in March 2019 (i.e. after the two deployments of AFR about which the Appellant complains).
SWP Documents
SWP Policy Document
SWP have issued a policy document entitled “Policy on Sensitive Processing of Law Enforcement Purposes, under Part 3 Data Protection Act 2018 ” (Version 2.0, November 2018) (“the November 2018 Policy Document”). That Policy Document
sets out SWP's policy as regards compliance with the six Data Protection Principles in Part 3 of the DPA 2018: